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Note
IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION IN THE POST-9/11 ERA:
A CASE FOR INCREASED JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT AND
RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO HEAR SPEECH
SEAN D. ACEVEDO
Following the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the George W.
Bush Administration actively engaged in a policy of ideological exclusion.
During the Bush Administration, the State Department routinely denied
visas to foreign nationals whose political views it disfavored. The primary
targets of ideological exclusion during the post-9/11 era were members of
the Arab and Muslim intellectual communities. Opponents have argued
that ideological exclusion violates United States citizens’ First Amendment
right to hear and debate speech. After offering an extensive background of
the history of ideological exclusion in the United States, this Note argues
that the Bush Administration’s policy of ideological exclusion did, in fact,
violate United States citizens’ right to hear and debate speech. It then
discusses the steps that the judiciary must take in order to create a
sustainable policy against ideological exclusion.
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IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION IN THE POST-9/11 ERA:
A CASE FOR INCREASED JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT AND
RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO HEAR SPEECH
SEAN D. ACEVEDO∗
I. INTRODUCTION
During the so-called “War on Terror” that began shortly after the terror
attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States government has openly
engaged in a campaign of increased security. This policy of increased
security has, in turn, entailed a tradeoff of basic individual liberties. To an
extent, federal constitutional safeguards have failed to assuage the
usurpation of the basic individual liberties of United States citizens and
non-citizens alike. Although the tradeoff of increased security for
decreased individual liberties has much precedent in American history, the
“ideological exclusion” of Muslim scholars did not become prominent
until the latter half of the twentieth century.1 The United States
government engaged in the practice with even more vigor following the
terror attacks of September 11, 2001. Using subtly crafted provisions of
the United States Patriot Act of 2001, the George W. Bush Administration
actively engaged in the exclusion of scholars who espoused political views
that challenged American foreign policy during the “War on Terror.” The
Administration’s policy undermined the basic First Amendment civil
liberties of United States citizens and non-citizens alike.
The post-9/11 tradeoff of basic liberties for improvements in security
has culminated in the reinvigoration of the United States government’s
“ideological exclusion” of foreign individuals who seek to present
ideological perspectives that run contrary to American foreign policy.2
Although less severe in both gravity and pervasiveness in comparison to
the McCarthyism policies of the Cold War era,3 the post-9/11 exclusion of

∗

Fairfield University, B.A. magna cum laude, 2010; University of Connecticut School of Law,
J.D. expected 2013. I would like to thank Professor Gordon Silverstein for his guidance and thoughtful
feedback during my preparation of this Note. I would also like to thank the staff members of Volume
45 of the Connecticut Law Review for their excellent feedback and edits. Finally, I would like to thank
my family and friends for their patience and support.
1
Suzanne Ito, Time to Retire Ideological Exclusion, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 21, 2010,
6:28 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/time-retire-ideological-exclusion.
2
Id.
3
See infra Part III.
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Muslim scholars has ignited anger among a number of civil rights groups.4
These groups—the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) prominent
among them—have argued that the ideological exclusion of foreign
Muslim scholars violates the constitutional right of United States citizens
to hear, question, and debate speech, as set forth in the First Amendment.5
Ideological exclusion has also been met with vehement disapproval among
members of the legal community.6 Other scholars have offered the
relatively less persuasive—but not entirely misplaced—argument that
ideological exclusion violates allegedly anti-American non-citizens’ First
Amendment rights.7
By focusing on the role of the judicial and executive branches in the
practice of ideological exclusion, this Note examines three important
aspects of this debate. Following a brief introduction to the history of
ideological exclusion in the United States, this Note discusses whether
American citizens do, in fact, have a constitutionally protected right to hear
the speech of foreign nationals. Second, it discusses the validity of the
claim that the Bush Administration denied entry of foreign nationals on the
basis of their respective ideological positions. Finally, the Note critiques
the steps that the Obama Administration has taken in redressing the wrongs
that the Bush Administration allegedly committed. Although the Obama
Administration and a number of federal appellate courts have acted
favorably on behalf of opponents of ideological exclusion,8 a solution to
the current problem requires a uniform and definitive ruling that
ideological exclusion in its purest form is, in fact, unconstitutional.
This Note offers two potential solutions to the current problem. The
first is a broader standard of judicial review. The second is a balancing test
in which the judiciary first determines whether the exclusionary policy
infringes upon First Amendment rights, and then determines whether that
interest outweighs United States security interests. This, in turn, requires a
4
It is important to note that ideological exclusion during the Bush Administration was by no
means limited to Muslim scholars. There were a number of cases during this period in which the
executive either excluded or conditioned the admission of foreign nationals into the United States. See,
e.g., Bustamante v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding the executive’s
exclusion of a Mexican national on the basis that the Consulate “had reason to believe that he was a
controlled substance trafficker,” which the court determined was “plainly a facially legitimate reason,
as it [was] a statutory basis for inadmissibility” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Because this type
of exclusion poses an entirely different set of questions, however, the scope of this Note is limited to
the exclusion of Muslim scholars who were, or are, excluded in direct relation to the “War on Terror.”
5
See Ito, supra note 1 (arguing that the practice of ideological exclusion infringes upon United
States citizens’ right to hear constitutionally protected speech).
6
See, e.g., Mitchell C. Tilner, Ideological Exclusion of Aliens: The Evolution of a Policy, 2 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 1–2 (1988) (arguing that exclusion on ideological grounds is, in a sense, an
“illegitimate” practice).
7
See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 999–1000 (2002).
8
See infra Part VI.
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higher degree of judicial review over executive decision making in this
area.
II. A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION AND THE
ARGUMENT AGAINST IT
Ideological exclusion has a long and storied history in United States
government policymaking.9 Ideological exclusion refers to the “routine[]
deni[al of] visas to foreign scholars, writers, and artists who . . . hold
[certain minority or purportedly hostile] political views.”10 The United
States government has historically taken steps—both publicly and
privately—to exclude potentially “dangerous” foreign nationals from
speaking publicly in the United States.11 Some of these exclusions—
particularly during the Cold War—have taken place in the public eye and
with widespread public approval. Others—such as the current exclusion of
scholars of the Muslim and Arab world—have taken place far more
surreptitiously.
The most recent exclusion of foreign nationals on ideological grounds
derives from § 411 of the United States Patriot Act of 2001 (“USA Patriot
Act”).12 The USA Patriot Act significantly amended § 212(a)(3) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.13 Under § 411 of the USA Patriot Act,
the United States executive branch may deny the right to a visa to a
relatively broad range of foreign nationals seeking entry into the United
States.14 Section 411 further provides that the executive could conclude
that an individual is “inadmissible” under § 212(a)(3) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act on the grounds that he or she was a member of, or
participated in:
(aa) a foreign terrorist organization, as designated by the
Secretary of State under section 219, or
9

See infra Part III.
The Excluded: Ideological Exclusion and the War on Ideas, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Oct.
25, 2007), http://www.aclu.org/national-security/excluded-ideological-exclusion-and-war-ideas.
11
See infra Parts III, V.
12
Pub. L. 107–56, sec. 411, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3), 115 Stat. 272, 345–50 (2001). The official
title of the USA Patriot Act is the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Interrupt and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.” Pub. L. 107-56, sec. 1(a), 115 Stat. 272
(2001). For an early account of the USA Patriot Act, see Michael T. McCarthy, USA Patriot Act, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 435–53 (2002) (arguing that the Act gives the Attorney General “greater
authority” to “detain and deport aliens suspected of having terrorist ties”).
13
Pub. L. 107–56, sec. 411, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3), 115 Stat. 272, 345–50 (2001).
14
See ACLU Challenges Patriot Act Provision Used to Exclude Prominent Swiss Scholar from
the United States, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Jan. 25, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/nationalsecurity/aclu-challenges-patriot-act-provision-used-exclude-prominent-swiss-scholar-united- (arguing
that the USA Patriot Act provision “prevent[s] United States citizens and residents from hearing speech
that is protected by the First Amendment”).
10
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(bb) a political, social, or other similar group whose public
endorsement of acts of terrorist activity the Secretary of State
has determined undermines United States efforts to reduce or
eliminate terrorist activities.15
Perhaps the most worrisome aspect of the USA Patriot Act provision is
its broad scope. By covering such an expansive class of individuals—not
only terrorist organizations, but also any individual whom the State
Department deems to challenge the United States government’s efforts to
combat terrorism domestically and internationally—the Act undermines
the basic constitutional right of United States citizens to hear protected
speech. Georgetown University Law Professor David Cole has pointed to
at least two “constitutional infirmities” in the USA Patriot Act legislation:
first is the imposition of guilt by association for an individual’s association
with a “terrorist organization,” regardless of his or her connection to
violence or terrorist acts; second is the government’s use of secret evidence
to determine the outcome of legal proceedings concerning a non-citizen’s
liberty or property, counter to the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment.16 As this Note will discuss, it was on these very premises
that the Bush Administration deported foreign scholars.17 Following
Congress’s ratification of the USA Patriot Act, the Bush Administration’s
actions confirmed that the amended inadmissibility criteria would be used
not only in theory, but also in practice.18
Scholars and groups opposed to ideological exclusion rely on the
textual and structural foundation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. The First Amendment reads, in pertinent part: “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.”19 The argument of opponents of
ideological exclusion is weak insofar as it relies on a perceived
constitutional right of non-citizen foreign nationals to speech. However, as
this Note will discuss, the argument is much more persuasive insofar as it
contends that American citizens have the constitutional right to hear
speech.20
III. A HISTORY OF IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES
The history of exclusion of foreign nationals whose views threaten the
15

Pub. L. 107–56, sec. 411, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3), 115 Stat. 272, 345–46 (2001).
See Cole, supra note 7, at 966–69, 1000–01.
17
See infra Part V.
18
See id.
19
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
20
See infra Parts IV–VII.
16
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social fabric and security of the United States reflects a history of panic
and fear. The government’s fear of tyranny from within and the resulting
use of ideological exclusion have taken two distinct paths in American
history: in one pattern—perhaps most prominent during the McCarthyism
era of the late 1940s to late 1950s—the United States government has
openly suppressed ideological dissent.21 In another, the United States
government has used subtle tactics in an effort to discretely suppress what
it perceives to be the ideologically dangerous views of foreigners.22
When the concept of ideological exclusion is the subject of debate or
intellectual discourse, one often discusses prominent Cold War
intellectuals, artists, and activists. An editorial published in the New York
Times in 2009, for example, stated that twenty years had passed since
Congress repealed the denial of visas to such prominent figures as “the
Colombian novelist Gabriel García Márquez, the Chilean poet Pablo
Neruda, and the British novelist Doris Lessing.”23 But the starting point of
exclusion based on belief or creed—whether or not such belief was
ideological—began more than four hundred years prior to the beginning of
the Cold War.
A. The Colonial Period
As early as the colonial period, colonists established policies that
excluded newcomers who they perceived as “undesirable.”24 Colonists
excluded individuals on the basis of both social undesirability—beggars,
debtors, and paupers, to name a few—and religious belief.25 The
Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example, discouraged the entrance of
individuals “who did not accept its official policy of ecclesiastical
domination.”26 Religious groups excluded during the colonial period
ranged from Quakers and Catholics to radical religious separatists.27
21

See infra Part III.B.
See Tilner, supra note 6, at 1 (“On the record, government officials steadfastly deny that the
United States follows such [an exclusionary ideological] policy or that aliens are ever excluded on
ideological grounds.”).
23
Visas and Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, at A32.
24
Tilner, supra note 6, at 4.
25
Id. at 4, 6–7. At least one scholar has argued that the colonists used banishment and
deportation as a means of “rid[ding] itself of thousands of undesirables.” James R. Edwards, Jr., Ctr.
for Immigration Studies, Keeping Extremists Out: The History of Ideological Exclusion, and the Need
for Its Revival, BACKGROUNDER, Sept. 2005, at 1, 2, available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.to
pic183766.files/Class_Ten_-_National_Security_and_Immigration/EdwardsJr_Keeping_
Extremists_Out.pdf.
26
Tilner, supra note 6, at 6.
27
Edwards, supra note 25, at 2. For example, in 1643, the Virginia establishment ordered that
Roman Catholic priests be deported within five days after their arrival in the colony. Id. The
unfavorable treatment of Roman Catholics stemmed from Old World tensions between Roman
Catholics and Protestants, as well as the idea that the New World was a location to which religious
22
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Perhaps the most famous and celebrated early colonial banishment was that
of Sir Roger Williams from the Massachusetts Bay Colony.28 In October
of 1635, the Massachusetts establishment found the Puritan minister guilty
of spreading “newe [sic] [and] dangerous opinions” about religious
freedom and separation from the Church of England.29 The primary means
of exclusion during the colonial era was banishment, which may properly
be regarded as the colonial equivalent of deportation.30 There is little to no
evidence that any of the colonies banished individuals solely on ideological
or political grounds prior to the Declaration of Independence.31 However,
at least one historian has argued that the colonists banished on the grounds
of religious disposition at least partially in order to protect the social
order.32 In a critique in support of ideological exclusion,33 Professor
James Edwards notes that early American colonists instituted the system of
banishment in order “to preserve and protect the character of the society
they and their forefathers paid so high a price to establish.”34 During the
course of American history, advocates of exclusionary policies have
continued to base their arguments on the exigency of protecting the United
States from dangerous outsiders.
B. The Cold War Era
One may assume that colonial banishments are mere remnants of
another era, far removed from the practice of ideological exclusion in the
United States during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. To
some extent, this assertion is correct; religious-based deportation no longer
serves as a major facet of exclusion jurisprudence. Contrary to popular
belief, however, ideological exclusion has occupied a noteworthy position
dissenters could flee as an escape from religious tyranny in Europe. See id. (“[I]t hardly seemed
prudent to have established a society for religious dissenters . . . only to allow a hostile takeover by
potential persecutors.”). The tension between Roman Catholics and Protestants only intensified in the
eighteenth century, which was a relatively belligerent period between the Roman Catholic empires of
France and Spain, on the one hand, and the English colonies, on the other. Id. at 3.
28
For a general discussion of Roger Williams’ background, as well as his banishment, see Roger
Williams Banished: October 9, 1635, MASS MOMENTS, http://www.massmoments.org/moment.cfm?mi
d=292 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) [hereinafter Roger Williams Banished].
29
Id.
30
Tilner, supra note 6, at 6. Exclusion was not limited to banishment; Edwards notes that other
means of exclusion included requirements that ships’ captains supply passenger manifests and the
imposition of duties or bonds on arrivals adjudged as a threat to public order or a burden on society.
Edwards, supra note 25, at 2.
31
Cf. Tilner, supra note 6, at 6–8 (arguing that, although the colonists did not banish on
ideological grounds, they may have effectively done so insofar as a religious doctrine “entails adherence
to a corresponding political . . . view”).
32
See Roger Williams Banished, supra note 28 (stating that the banishment of Roger Williams
was based on his views’ “serious threat to the social order”).
33
Edwards, supra note 25, at 1–2.
34
Id. at 2.
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in the United States throughout the past century. In fact, ideological
exclusion reached its peak during the Cold War.
Perhaps the United States government’s clearest and most overt
expression of ideological exclusion occurred in 1952, when Congress
implemented the McCarran-Walter Act.35 The origins of the Act reach as
far back as the 1930s, when Representative Hamilton Fish called for the
outright exclusion of communists in response to the excessively “open and
militant” nature of communist activity during the Depression era.36
Representative Fish and his congressional committee feared the rise of the
communist agenda in the United States, particularly in light of the
desperate economic conditions of the 1930s.37 Despite opposition,
including a presidential veto, the legislature finally enacted the McCarranWalter Act in 1952.38
The McCarran-Walter Act passed by overwhelming majorities in both
the House of Representatives and the Senate.39 Upon enactment, the law
provided thirty-three categories of excludable aliens, nine of which were
new.40 Three grounds for exclusion covered the overlap of security and
politics: (1) § 212(a)(27) excluded non-citizens who participated in
activities that would be prejudicial to the public interest or public safety;
(2) § 212(a)(28) excluded non-citizens who belonged to subversive
organizations or taught or advocated political views; and (3) § 212(a)(29)
excluded non-citizens who the State Department deemed likely to engage
in subversive activities once in the United States.41 Although Professor
Edwards argues that these subsections were “noncontroversial,”42 they
threatened the First Amendment right of Americans to hear and debate
speech. Not only were these provisions prejudicial toward the interests of
non-citizens, but they were also written in an overly broad manner. At the
very least, the legislature should have carved narrower provisions tailored
to the specific and particularized security concerns of the executive branch.
35
The McCarran-Walter Act is officially known as the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101–524 (1982)). According to one commentator, the years of the McCarran-Walter Act represent
the “height” of ideological exclusion. Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid
Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51, 53 (1999). The same commenter notes that
although the McCarran-Walter Act was eventually repealed, “its most troubling provisions continue to
be applied almost exclusively against aliens of Arab nationality or origin.” Id.
36
Edwards, supra note 25, at 5 (citation omitted).
37
See id. (discussing congressional momentum to combat Communism during the Depression).
38
Id. at 7.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 7–8.
42
See id. (“This noncontroversial subsection kept out aliens expected to engage in espionage,
sabotage, public disorder, or activity that risks national security or use of force or violence to overthrow
the U.S. government.”).
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Instead, the Act could be interpreted to cover any immigrant or foreign
national. In this way, the provisions denied United States citizens the right
to hear and debate the political and ideological perspectives of foreign
nationals. This issue has arisen to an even greater extent in the post-9/11
era.43
The primary goal of the McCarran-Walter Act was to prevent
communist sympathizers from espousing their political views within the
United States.44 The courts generally upheld the application of ideological
exclusion under the Act.45 In fact, Congress made only one serious
amendment to the Act; in 1977, the legislature enacted the McGovern
Amendment, which permitted the Attorney General “to waive the
exclusion of any noncitizen affiliated with an organization proscribed by
the United States.”46 Interestingly, Congress carved an exception to the
McGovern Amendment that prohibited waiver of the exclusion for
members of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1979.47 The
McCarran-Walter Act was chief among the legislative instruments that
resulted in the exclusion of over 8,000 non-citizen aliens originating from
ninety-eight countries between 1952 and 1984.48
The McCarran-Walter Act and the subsequent exclusion of alleged
Soviet sympathizers signaled one of the most alarming aspects of modern
ideological exclusion: it caused minority groups to fear intermingling with
individuals who shared their own cultural or racial background. Although
it is likely that many immigrants during the 1950s and 1960s did, in fact,
embrace radical communist principles,49 many others were punished
simply because they sought affiliation with members of their respective
racial or cultural groups.50 Perhaps the simplest means of affiliating
oneself with members of one’s own racial or cultural group is through
membership in organizations. Fear of joining such groups was one likely
consequence—intended or not—of the McCarran-Walter Act. In this way,
the Act created a major hurdle for immigrants seeking to assimilate into a
new way of life in the United States. The post-9/11 exclusion of Muslim
43

See infra Part V.
Akram, supra note 35, at 56. Provisions (a)(27) to (29) of the Act permitted the State
Department to exclude or deport communists, anarchists, and members of socialist labor and subversive
organizations on the basis of ideological disposition. Id.
45
Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After
September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295, 317
(2002).
46
Id. at 318.
47
Id.
48
Akram, supra note 35, at 56–57.
49
See Edwards, supra note 25, at 5 (arguing that it is “plain” from The Venona Secrets and
actions by the Communist International, or Comintern, that Soviet Communists sought to undermine
the United States government politically).
50
Id.
44
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and Arab scholars poses a slightly different, but parallel, problem.
Although the exclusion of scholars does not impact their ability to
assimilate into a new society, it will likely cause them to refrain from
making assertions that they would otherwise make. This may have an even
more far-reaching impact; not only does ideological exclusion affect the
excluded individual, but it may also adversely impact the ability of United
States citizens to hear—and therefore become informed about—the
perspectives of foreign scholars.
C. Beyond the Cold War: Ideological Exclusion and Judicial Review
Throughout the greater part of the past century, the judicial doctrine of
“consular nonreviewability” has been instrumental in protecting legislative
enactments used by the executive branch to implement its policy of
ideological exclusion. Over the past forty years, federal courts have ruled
that executive decisions excluding foreign individuals from entry into the
United States are beyond the scope of judicial review.51 Prior to 1972,
however, federal circuit court and Supreme Court decisions often
contradicted one another.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kleindienst v. Mandel52 followed a
relatively long line of cases in which activist federal judges sought to
cultivate a less extensive degree of deference to executive decision
making. During the McCarthyism era of the 1950s and 1960s, activist
judges promulgated the “meaningful association” exception to ideological
exclusion.53 This exception required that an act of ideological exclusion
result from the individual’s performance of a voluntary activity in support
of a Communist government, military, or organization.54 Unfortunately,
the Court’s decision in Mandel brought judicial activism in this area to a
halt.
According to some scholars, opponents of ideological exclusion
suffered a major defeat in the Supreme Court’s decision in Mandel.55 In
51
See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (upholding the constitutionality of a
statute that delegated to the executive the conditional authority to exclude foreign nationals and
declining to address any “First Amendment . . . grounds [that] may [have been] available for attacking
exercise of discretion”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950)
(upholding a congressional statute that similarly granted the executive the authority to exclude foreign
nationals for security purposes).
52
408 U.S. 753 (1972).
53
Edwards, supra note 25, at 8.
54
See id. (providing various examples of judicial activism, including Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290 (1961), in which the Supreme Court exonerated a convicted communist sympathizer on the
grounds that he merely advocated communist doctrine—not communist action—in the United States).
55
See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 25, at 8–9 (explaining that, in the Mandel decision, the Supreme
Court denied the non-citizen Belgian socialist relief—despite the fact that the denial was based on mere
advocacy for world communist principles—on the grounds that the denial for “facially legitimate and
bona fide reasons” fell within the authority of the United States (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Mandel, the Court reviewed the executive’s exclusion of a self-proclaimed
“revolutionary Marxist” who had been invited to attend a conference at
Stanford University and to lecture at a number of other universities in the
United States.56 The Court held that § 212(a)(28) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act was constitutional—at least insofar as it vested the
Attorney General with the conditional authority to exclude foreign
nationals or to prescribe conditions for their entry into the United States.57
The Court reasoned that the judiciary did not possess the discretion to
review these types of executive decisions, regardless of concerns related to
abuse of discretion or First Amendment rights.58 The Court explained its
decision to decline to rule on First Amendment grounds:
[T]he plenary discretionary authority Congress granted the
Executive [would] become[] a nullity, or courts in each case
would be required to weigh the strength of the audience’s
interest against that of the Government in refusing a waiver
to the particular alien applicant, according to some as yet
undetermined standard. The dangers and the undesirability
of making that determination on the basis of factors such as
the size of the audience or the probity of the speaker’s ideas
are obvious. Indeed, it is for precisely this reason that the
waiver decision has, properly, been placed in the hands of the
Executive.59
Commentators refer to the judiciary’s decision to decline discretion in this
area as the “doctrine of consular nonreviewability.”60 This doctrine, which
has held a paramount position in United States jurisprudence for over
seventy-five years, stipulates that the judicial branch may not review an
executive consular officer’s decision to deny a visa to a foreign national.61
As this Note will discuss,62 some circuit courts have only recently allowed
limited judicial review.
Following the Mandel decision, the Supreme Court repeatedly
questioned the State Department’s broad discretion with respect to
ideological exclusion decision making. In Reagan v. Abourezk,63 for
example, the Supreme Court reviewed a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
56

Mandel, 408 U.S. at 756–57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at 770 (“[W]hen the Executive exercises this power [to exclude aliens] . . . on the basis
of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that
discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests . . . .”).
58
Id.
59
Id. at 768–69.
60
Margaret Laufman, Comment, American Academy of Religion v. Napolitano, 55 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 1173, 1174 (2011).
61
Id.
62
See infra Part VI.
63
484 U.S. 1 (1987).
57
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judgment in favor of a United States Senator from South Dakota who sued
the Ronald Reagan Administration’s State Department for denying nonimmigrant visas to certain non-citizens who were invited to attend
conferences or address interested audiences in the United States.64 On
remand, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ruled in favor
of the Senator.65
Regardless of the reasoning behind the policy of ideological exclusion
in the United States, the doctrine raises very serious concerns about the
First Amendment rights of American citizens. Furthermore, the very fact
that the United States government has, in the vast majority of cases, denied
that it excludes foreign nationals on the basis of ideology suggests that
such exclusions are in some way wrong. The next section will turn to a
discussion of the judiciary’s recognition of a constitutionally protected
right to hear speech.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO HEAR SPEECH
The constitutional right of United States citizens to hear the speech of
foreign nationals is of fundamental importance to an analysis of the role of
the judiciary. Although it is well known that the First Amendment protects
United States citizens from the government’s infringement on their own
right to voice their opinions, it is less widely understood that the First
Amendment protects citizens’ right to hear the speech of others.66 In fact,
the Supreme Court has consistently recognized such a right of United
States citizens to hear speech under the First Amendment. The right of
United States citizens to hear speech can and should be applied in the
context of Muslim and Arab scholars speaking in public forums in the
United States.
The Supreme Court recognized the First Amendment right of United
States citizens to hear speech in the landmark case, Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC.67 Through the administrative rulemaking process, the FCC
required broadcast stations to present public issues that were of interest to
the general public.68 It further required the broadcast stations to give each
side of the public issues fair coverage.69 As part of this administrative
rulemaking, the FCC delineated an “equal time” rule and a “response to
personal attack” rule.70 The Court upheld both rules.71 Writing for the
64
The Implications of “Abourezk v. Reagan,” CAPITOL HILL CUBANS (June 11, 2009, 12:18 PM),
http://www.capitolhillcubans.com/2009/06/implications-of-abourezk-v-reagan.html.
65
Edwards, supra note 25, at 10.
66
OFF. OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, CAL. STATE UNIV., HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH ISSUES 1 (2009).
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395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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Id. at 369.
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Id.
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majority, Justice Byron White reasoned that the right of the viewers and
listeners to hear speech was of chief importance to the Court’s decision:
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function
consistently with the ends and purposes of the First
Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not
the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.72
In its analysis in Red Line Broadcasting, the Court focused on the right
of United States citizens to receive information. The Court’s policy
rationale for the right to receive information was that individuals should
have the freedom and liberty to differentiate between and choose among a
variety of sources of information, perspectives, and ideas.73
The Court’s reasoning in Red Lion Broadcasting is highly applicable
in the context of Muslim and Arab scholars speaking in the United States.
When a court does, in fact, rule on ideological exclusion, it will likely
determine whether United States citizens have a right to hear
constitutionally protected speech, rather than whether non-citizens have a
constitutionally protected right to speak. The Red Lion Broadcasting
analysis can easily be applied to this case. By excluding Muslim scholars,
the United States government is not only forbidding the excluded
individuals from speaking; it is also infringing upon the right of United
States citizens to hear the excluded individuals speak. This is the most
troublesome encroachment of First Amendment individual liberties. The
United States government is effectively forbidding United States citizens—
the “listeners” of the speech of foreign nationals—from exercising the right
to hear.
V. THE CURRENT PROBLEM:
IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION DURING THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION
While the United States government’s practice of ideological exclusion
during the late twentieth century targeted communist sympathizers, the
policies of the Bush Administration primarily impacted Arab and Muslim
scholars. As the following section will discuss, the lack of judicial
oversight during the Bush era necessitates further measures that would
serve as a check on the executive’s ability to exclude individuals who
contribute to constructive intellectual and political discourse in the United
States.
71

Id. at 380.
Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
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From the very outset of the “War on Terror,” the Bush Administration
“consistently asserted that it has the authority to engage in ideological
exclusion.”74 Just six weeks after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001,
Congress passed the USA Patriot Act.75 The USA Patriot Act significantly
enhanced the United States government’s security interests at the expense
of individual liberties.76 Among other provisions, the Bush Administration
benefited from the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, which precludes
judicial review of its denial of visas to controversial scholars. Although
there were likely many cases of ideological exclusion during the Bush
Administration, the cases of two scholars—Professors Tariq Ramadan and
Adam Habib—received broad attention from a number of media outlets.
Following a discussion of the plight of these individuals during the Bush
Administration, the next section focuses on the outcome of those cases
during the Obama Administration.
A. Pre-9/11: Exclusion of Arab and Muslim Scholars in the 1990s
It is important to note that the ideological exclusion of Arab and
Muslim scholars did not begin during the Bush Administration. Rather,
the current exclusion of Arab and Muslim intellectuals began at least as
early as the late 1990s.77 In a 1999 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal
article, Professor Susan Akram argued that the ideological exclusion of
Arab and Muslim scholars was both dangerous and—even more
alarmingly—likely to succeed because of the “negative stereotyping
equating them with terrorists,” their “negligible political muscle,” and the
“legislative and executive activity directed to silence, exclude, deport and
restrict them.”78
During the Clinton Administration, the State Department used a
variety of tactics to exclude Muslim scholars. Not only did Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright target Muslim and Arab scholars, but she did so
discretely by using classified evidence. By 1999, at least twenty-five
immigrants in the United States faced deportation or removal on the basis
of “evidence that the Immigration and Naturalization Service . . . refused to
disclose” on the grounds that it was “classified.”79 Even prior to the
attacks of September 11, 2001, there was a widespread belief among
74
Timothy Zick, Territoriality and the First Amendment: Free Speech at—and Beyond—Our
Borders, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1556–57 (2010).
75
USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. 107–56, sec. 1(a), 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
76
See Cole, supra note 7, at 966 (stating that the USA Patriot Act seeks to combat terrorism by
making non-citizens deportable for activities ranging from associational activity and speech).
77
Akram, supra note 35, at 53–54 (stating that the McCarran-Walter Act’s most troubling
provisions continued to be applied against Muslim and Arab scholars during the 1990s).
78
Id. at 54.
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members of the legal community that the use of such “classified evidence”
in deportation proceedings targeted the speech, association, and religious
activities of Muslim immigrants, Arab immigrants, and permanent
residents of Arab or Muslim origin.80 Even more disturbing was the
adverse impact that the Clinton Administration’s tactics had on the right of
citizens to hear speech under the First Amendment. Any infringement on
the right of individuals to hear speech necessarily decreases public
discourse and progressivism. In seeking to further its own interests, the
Clinton Administration undermined the ability of citizens and non-citizens
alike to speak on issues that were of vital importance to an evolving
society. It is likely that the Clinton Administration’s failure to understand
the need for public discourse played a significant role in cross-cultural
misunderstanding between Arabs and Muslims, on the one hand, and
United States citizens, on the other. Furthermore, ideological exclusion
during the Clinton Administration paved the road for the exclusionary
policies of the Bush Administration.
B. Professor Tariq Ramadan
Although ideological exclusion was by no means limited to Arabs and
Muslims, the “War on Terror” has disproportionately impacted members of
these communities. American Academy of Religion v. Napolitano81 was
the first major case that challenged the Bush Administration’s adverse
treatment of non-citizen Muslim and Arab scholars. In Napolitano, the
organizational plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security
and the State Department82 regarding the exclusion of Tariq Ramadan, a
Swiss-born Islamic scholar who specializes in the integration of Muslim
beliefs with Western European culture and society.83 Ramadan has taken
positions on a number of controversial issues. He has argued, for example,
that Muslims “can be both fully Western and fully Muslim,” and that they
“need not simply choose a path of assimilation or a path of isolation.”84
According to some commentators, however, the State Department may
have feared Ramadan’s familial relation to his “radical” grandfather,
Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.85
80

See, e.g., id. at 52.
573 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2009).
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Francesco Isgro, Second Circuit Reviews Visa Denial: First Amendment Trumps Consular
Nonreviewability Doctrine, IMMIGR. LITIG. BULL., June–July 2009, at 1, 1.
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573 F.3d at 119. Ramadan has published twenty books and more than seven hundred articles
focusing on the integration of Muslim beliefs with Western European culture and society. American
Academy of Religion v. Napolitano–Case Profile, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 9, 2010),
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/american-academy-religion-v-napolitano-case-profile.
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Kirk Semple, At Last Allowed, Muslim Scholar Visits, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2010, at A29.
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Prior to August 2004, Ramadan regularly visited the United States as a
speaker at the State Department and some of America’s most prestigious
institutions of higher education.86 In January 2004, Ramadan accepted a
tenured position to teach religion, conflict, and peace building87 at the
University of Notre Dame.88 The United States embassy subsequently
revoked his visa without explanation. It did, however, disclose upon
repeated inquiry that it had done so under the USA Patriot Act provision
stating that the government may exclude prominent individuals who
“endorse or espouse terrorist activity.”89 The executive branch offered a
rather attenuated line of reasoning for its denial of Ramadan’s visa; it
stated that the scholar had given a monetary donation to a Swiss-based
charity, which in turn funded Hamas, a militant Palestinian group.90
Professor Ramadan, however, denied having any knowledge of the
connection between the Swiss-based charity and Hamas or any other
terrorist-related activities.91
The exclusion of Professor Ramadan represents the broad anti-Muslim
and anti-Arab position that the Bush Administration took in denying visas
to foreign scholars. It was not until 2010, after several months during
which Professor Ramadan’s visa was withheld, did the Second Circuit
overturn the denial of Professor Ramadan’s visa.92
C. Professor Adam Habib
A second example of the Bush Administration’s exclusion of Arab and
Muslim scholars is the case of Adam Habib, a professor at South Africa’s
University of Johannesburg.93 The South African intellectual community
regarded Habib as “an expert on issues of democracy, governance, race,
and South African politics, public policy, and social movements [and] . . . a
vocal critic of various aspects of U.S. foreign policy, including the war in
Iraq.”94 The State Department was likely most troubled by Professor
Habib’s vocal criticism of its foreign policy objectives during the “War on
Terror.”
86
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Professor Habib, a South African citizen, sought entry into the United
States in November 2006. He had been invited to meet with members of
the Social Science Research Council, Columbia University, the National
Institutes of Health, and the World Bank.95 Upon his arrival at John F.
Kennedy International Airport in New York City, however, the State
Department forbade Habib from entering the United States.96 Professor
Habib initially thought that his visa denial erroneously stemmed from his
detention as a political prisoner under the South African apartheid
However, Habib’s assumption was incorrect; the State
regime.97
Department subsequently extended the exclusion to Habib’s wife and two
sons.98 Even more alarmingly, the State Department never communicated
its reasons for revoking the visas of Professor Habib and his family.99
Although the ACLU almost immediately challenged Professor Habib’s
visa denial, the State Department’s decision was not overturned until
January 2010, when former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed an
order effectively ending the exclusion.100 Habib subsequently received a
ten-year visa to enter the United States and attended various meetings
throughout the country.101 However, the four-year period during which the
State Department denied Professor Habib’s visa signals an alarming policy
of ideological exclusion.
D. Other Cases of Ideological Exclusion During the Bush Era
Although the experiences of Professors Tariq Ramadan and Adam
Habib are of primary focus in this Note, it is important to emphasize that
their cases merely represent the widespread visa denials that took place
during the Bush Administration. Following the events of September 11,
2001, the Bush Administration also denied visas to Carlos Alzugaray
Treto, Waskar Ari, John Clark, and Haluk Gerger.102 Interestingly, the
government in these cases—like those of Ramadan and Habib—targeted
both teaching about activism and mere theoretical teachings about “antiAmerican” perspectives. Although many questions—including accuracy—
95
Gwendolyn Bradley, Scholars Excluded from the United States, QUESTIA,
http://www.aaup.org/aaup/pubsres/academe/2007/so/nb/excluded.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2013).
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AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.firstamendmentcoalition.org/2010/03/statedepartment-lifts-ban-on-scholars-banned-from-u-s-for-political-views/. Interestingly, former Secretary
of State Clinton effectively ended the exclusion of Professor Ramadan on the same day. These orders
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district court and before the case was reheard on the district court docket. See infra Part VI.B.
101
See Brown, supra note 100.
102
Bradley, supra note 95.

2013]

IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION IN THE POST 9/11 ERA

1449

may effectively undermine the non-citizens’ positions in some or all of
these cases, the alleged widespread use of ideological exclusion during the
Bush Administration is cause for concern. These concerns were not
addressed until President Barack Obama entered office in 2009.103 As the
following sections will discuss, there is a need for a definitive judicial
ruling in each federal circuit that the ideological exclusion of Muslim
scholars infringes upon the First Amendment right of United States citizens
to hear constitutionally protected speech.
VI. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION AND THE FEDERAL COURTS:
STEPS MADE AND STEPS NEEDED
During Hillary Clinton’s tenure as Secretary of State, the Obama
Administration took a number of steps to overturn ideological exclusions
that took place during the Bush Administration. In 2010, the ACLU filed
two successful actions on the part of American organizations seeking the
reversal of visa denials carried out during the Bush Administration:
American Academy of Religion v. Napolitano104 and American Sociological
Association v. Clinton.105 Furthermore, a more dated—but also better
established—line of United States Supreme Court cases have recognized a
First Amendment right to “hear, speak, and debate with” a visa
applicant.106 Although the steps that the Obama Administration has taken
have been relatively narrow and unrepresentative, these cases provide a
solid groundwork for potential future action by the State Department and
the courts.
A. Federal Court Discretion?: American Academy of Religion v.
Napolitano
Although Napolitano marked the resurgence of ideological exclusion
during the Bush Administration, it also demonstrated the substantial
progress that the courts and the Obama Administration have made in
overturning ideology-based visa denials. Given Ramadan’s reputation as a
controversial figure—since his views are not universally regarded as
“antagonistic to” American foreign policy per se—the ACLU’s challenge
of the State Department’s denial of Ramadan’s visa application is critical
to an understanding of the strides that the Obama Administration and the
federal courts have made in countering the exclusionary policies of the
Bush Administration.
In Napolitano, the organizational plaintiffs challenged the decision of
103
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the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to
grant summary judgment in favor of former Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security Michael Chertoff and former Secretary of State
Condoleeza Rice.107 At the appellate level, the appellants-in-error claimed
that the exclusion of Ramadan violated their First Amendment right to hear
speech.108 After finding that United States organizations do, in fact, have
First Amendment rights at stake when the State Department excludes
foreign scholars, artists, and politicians, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling.109 This decision
marked a substantial departure from the “hands off” demeanor that many
courts displayed during the Bush Administration. Indeed, it signaled a
shift from the doctrine of consular nonreviewability to one in which the
judiciary takes a more active role in reviewing the potential repercussions
that executive actions have on the constitutional rights of American
citizens.
The approach that the Court took in Napolitano would serve as an
effective foundation for future judicial review of visa denials. The
significance of the case lies in its two distinct but equally important
components. First, the substantive outcome of the case itself—the
overturning of the executive’s denial of Ramadan’s visa—signals a change
in the perception of at least one of the federal courts with regard to this
issue. The Second Circuit has finally recognized that a visa denial may, in
fact, infringe upon—or at least implicate—the First Amendment rights of
American citizens and organizations. Second, the ACLU’s successful
representation of the three organizational plaintiffs in this case—the
American Academy of Religion, the American Association of University
Professors, and the PEN American Center—suggests that the battleground
for adjudication on the issue will center on the constitutional right of
American citizens—though not necessarily foreign nationals—to hear and
debate the speech.
The two most obvious shortfalls of Napolitano are: (1) it is not binding
on courts outside the Second Circuit; and (2) it is difficult to calculate how
narrowly or broadly the decision will be interpreted in the future. These
factors equate to both unreliability and unpredictability. However, the case
also marks a substantial departure from the policies of the Bush
Administration and from the doctrine of consular nonreviewability.
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The recent trend toward admission of foreign nationals whose
ideological perspectives differ from the American government’s stance in
the “War on Terror” has not been limited to the courtroom. Since the
inauguration of President Barack Obama in January 2009, the State
Department has changed its tone with respect to ideological exclusion.
Perhaps the most well-known case dealing with this issue was American
Sociological Association v. Clinton.110 This action, which the ACLU
brought on behalf of the American Sociological Association, challenged
the exclusion of Adam Habib, the professor at the University of
Johannesburg who had been invited to lecture in the United States.111
While Habib’s case was pending in federal court, however, then Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton announced the reversal of the State Department’s
prior revocation of the professor’s visa.112 Professor Habib subsequently
planned to attend various conferences and meetings in the United States.113
At least one commentator has labeled the State Department’s
overturning of the exclusion as a “major victory for civil liberties.”114
While such optimism is both warranted and well founded, it must also be
exercised with caution. The following section will discuss the ephemeral
nature of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s orders. Although it is
unlikely that the State Department will again revoke the visas of Professors
Ramadan and Habib, it is very possible—perhaps even likely—that the
State Department will deny visas in the future.
VII. FROM IMPROVEMENT TO SUSTAINABILITY: THE NEED FOR MORE
WIDESPREAD JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
It is undeniable that the Obama Administration has taken significant
steps in an effort to redress the wrongs committed by the Bush
Administration with respect to ideological exclusion. Given the political
reality of four-year presidential terms, however, even the most uninformed
observer can foresee the potent instability of Secretary of State Clinton’s
orders. Furthermore, only the Second Circuit has affirmatively asserted the
right of the judiciary to review the State Department’s orders of
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exclusion. These realities lead to an important question: What steps can
be taken to provide accountability in the State Department? The most
effective means of providing such accountability would be through closer
judicial scrutiny in federal circuit courts throughout the United States. Not
only would closer judicial scrutiny overturn past visa denials on First
Amendment grounds, but it would also serve as a disincentive for the
executive branch to revoke visas in the future.
The central obstacle to curbing the ideological exclusion of Arab and
Muslim scholars is the doctrine of “plenary power” in matters concerning
immigration.116 Professor Susan Akram points to two “discrete” aspects of
the court’s plenary power in ideological exclusion jurisprudence: “(1) that
the Constitution does not constrain Congress or the Executive in matters
concerning immigration; and (2) that the courts will not review
congressional or executive action in the immigration area [sic].”117 There
have been two interpretations of the principle that the Supreme Court
promulgated in Mandel.118 One interpretation suggests that the Court
applied its plenary review power.119 The other suggests that it did not.120
However, any sustainable policy against ideological exclusion—in the
current “War on Terror” or otherwise—would require a reassessment of
the judicially created plenary power and the Mandel decision.
The best approach would be for courts to adopt an amended version of
the Second Circuit’s interpretation in Napolitano. The Second Circuit’s
approach did not establish a doctrine of broad judicial review; rather, it
provided a doctrine of narrow judicial review. Under the Second Circuit’s
approach, the judiciary simply has the authority to review the effect that
exclusion has on the First Amendment rights of American citizens.
However, the Court’s test should not be limited to the Napolitano analysis.
Perhaps the most suitable test would be for the Court to pose the following
two questions: (1) does the government action infringe upon the First
Amendment rights of either the person subject to exclusion or United
States citizens?; and (2) if so, how does this balance against the United
States government’s legitimate policy goal of furthering its security
objectives? Ideally, the Court would presume that the individual’s First
Amendment rights should be protected. Under this approach, the judiciary
would likely overrule many of the executive’s ideological exclusion
115
See supra Part VI.A (discussing how the Second Circuit’s ruling in Napolitano was significant
for future judicial review of similar appeals).
116
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decisions that infringe on First Amendment rights. It would likely mend
the current system in which there are very minimal means of protecting the
constitutionally protected right of American citizens to hear speech and
engage in meaningful debate. Courts may also be more willing to assume
the role of balancing security interests against First Amendment interests,
rather than merely reviewing First Amendment rights regardless of the
potential security threat.
There are two possibilities in actions against ideological exclusion. In
the first case, the application would be made on behalf of a United States
citizen asserting his or her First Amendment right to hear speech. The
second possibility would be that a non-citizen would apply on his or her
own behalf. A non-citizen’s application would face a much more difficult
burden. In this case, any steps toward judicial discretion require that the
courts understand the policy implications of ruling in favor of non-citizens.
Professor David Cole provides three reasons for treating non-citizens the
same as citizens.121 First, the Constitution imposes “substantial limits” on
tradeoffs of immigrants’ liberties for citizens’ security.122 By both
domestic and international standards, the basic rights that are at stake in
exclusion cases—political freedom, due process, and equal protection of
the laws—apply to all persons subject to the laws, rather than citizens
alone.123 Second, a double standard undermines the legitimacy of the
United States government both domestically and internationally, and
therefore would be counterproductive in both spheres.124 Legitimacy is
important at both the domestic level and the international level, as it leads
to greater cooperation among members of both communities. Third,
permitting the government to create unfavorable policies for non-citizens
establishes precedent for the government’s adverse treatment of United
States citizens.125 These policy implications necessitate a type of judicial
review that takes into account the propensity of the executive to infringe
upon the rights and entitlements of United States citizens and non-citizens
alike.
Although well-founded, Professor Cole’s arguments are certainly not
all-inclusive. One can offer at least two more persuasive policy reasons for
abolishing ideological exclusion. The first reason is related to the “melting
pot” theory that has been prominent throughout much of United States
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history.
Throughout most of its history, the United States has accepted
conflicting cultural, political, and social viewpoints—regardless of the
potential repercussions of such broad tolerance. The open discourse of
these political and ideological perspectives suggests that the American
“melting pot” theory is not limited to cultural and social integration; rather,
it covers various types of thought, including differing sociopolitical
viewpoints.127 Without the presence of differing ideological viewpoints,
the “melting pot” will effectively cease to exist. Ideological exclusion
serves as a proverbial “wall” between the United States and political
discourse. If the government is to continue to accept differing ideological
perspectives, it must cease excluding Muslim and Arab scholars on purely
ideological and political grounds.
One scholar’s recent analysis, favorable to ideological exclusion,
ironically generates another policy reason for removing ideological
exclusion from the United States government’s agenda. According to
Professor James Edwards, the exclusion and removal of aliens who exhibit
“unwanted characteristics” has become a “traditional American
practice.”128 Professor Edwards draws a parallel between past instances of
ideological exclusion and the heightened concerns with post-9/11
Islamofascism.129 He points to the observations of journalist Michelle
Malkin:
The Japanese espionage network and the Islamic terrorist
network exploited many of the same immigration loopholes
and relied on many of the same institutions to enter the
country and insinuate themselves into the American
mainstream. Members of both networks arrived here on
student visas and religious visas. Both used spiritual
centers—Buddhist churches for the Japanese, mosques for
the Islamists—as central organizing points. Both used
native-language newspapers to foment subversive tendencies.
Both leaned on extensive ethnic- or religious-based
fundraising groups for support—kais for the Japanese,
126
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Islamic charities for Middle Eastern terrorists. . . . Both
aggressively recruited American citizens as spies or
saboteurs, especially . . . inside their ethnic communities.
Both were spearheaded by fanatics with an intense interest in
biological and chemical weapons.130
The flaw in Edwards’s argument lies in his reliance on what he perceives
to be a “traditional American practice.” Regardless of whether ideological
exclusion is a “traditional American practice”—an assertion that is
debatable in itself—the practice is wrongful. Provided that they possess
the ability to review the State Department’s judgments, the courts should
ban the practice of ideological exclusion for posterity—regardless of how
often the government has used it in the past. This argument is based on the
common sense notion that the mere fact that an action has been taken in the
past neither necessitates nor justifies its use in the future.
Professor Edwards further argues that foreign terrorist organizations
launched significant operations in the United States both before and after
the terror attacks of September 11, 2001.131 This argument has virtually no
bearing on the issue. During the Bush Administration, the State
Department excluded foreign scholars from the United States. Very few
observers would argue that the State Department should not have the
authority to exclude terror organizations in an attempt to prevent them
from recruiting or training in the United States. The benefit of exclusion
on these grounds is not profoundly ideological; rather, the exclusion of
terror organizations is a necessary means of fostering increased national
security.
The actions of the Obama Administration and the Second Circuit are
necessary, but not sufficient, steps in the abolition of ideological exclusion
in the United States. Even following the decisions by the State Department
and the Second Circuit, the actions of the Obama Administration and the
courts suggest that, although ideological exclusion must be limited, it is
also a necessary national security measure. The courts must take the lead
role in abolishing—or at least relinquishing—ideological exclusion.
Nowhere is judicial review a more vital component of a free and
democratic society than where constitutional rights are at stake.

130
Id. (quoting Michelle Malkin, In Defense of Internment: The Case for ‘Racial Profiling’ in
World War II and the War on Terror, MICHELLEMALKIN.COM (Aug. 3, 2004),
http://michellemalkin.com/2004/08/03/in-defense-of-internment-2/).
131
See id. at 14–15 (noting various instances of foreign terrorist organizations’ activities in the
United States, including a basic terrorist training and recruitment program run by Hamas outside
Chicago in 1990).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Obama Administration has made significant strides in its attempt
to retire ideological exclusion. Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
has been at the forefront of the battle against Bush-era tactics that sought to
prevent the spread of “dangerous” perspectives by excluding certain public
individuals from the United States. This Note seeks to demonstrate that,
while it has taken a number of significant steps, the Obama Administration
must continue to take further action to combat the policy. As an ACLU
staff attorney with the National Security Project, Melissa Goodman,
concisely stated following Hillary Clinton’s January 2010 orders: “The
Obama administration should now conduct a broader review of visas
denied under the Bush administration, reverse the exclusions of others who
were barred because of their political beliefs and retire the practice of
ideological exclusion for good.”132
The abolition of ideological exclusion requires action on the part of the
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. First, the legislature must not
enact laws that undermine basic individual liberties—regardless of whether
the individual is a citizen or non-citizen. Second, under its Article II
authority, the executive—the State Department in particular—must follow
the lead of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, whose actions against
ideological exclusion proved very successful. Finally, the judiciary has the
most important role to play. It must implement a heightened level of
judicial review over the actions of the executive branch. Historically and
theoretically, one of the primary roles of the judiciary has been to
safeguard the rights of minority groups. Such a responsibility necessitates
a heightened level of review with respect to ideological exclusion—
regardless of whether national security is at stake.
Too often, factions who oppose the expansion of constitutionally
protected rights to non-citizens argue that the implementation of such
measures will undermine the security concerns of the United States
government. They argue that the importance of security outweighs the
importance of individual liberties. Albeit difficult, it is imperative that
Americans separate the emotional turmoil they felt following the terror
attacks of September 11, 2001 from their perspective on the importance of
individual liberties. Even during the most turbulent periods of American
history, the United States government and its people have an obligation to
respect the basic and fundamental individual liberty of United States
citizens to hear and debate the speech.
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Ito, supra note 1.

